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Abstract
Trust is an essential component of buyer-seller
relationships, especially for online transactions.
Appropriate feedback mechanisms help buyers build trust
towards reputable sellers. Drawing from sociology and
economics, we show that buyers pay a price premium to
transact with reputable sellers, especially for expensive
products. To empirically examine the relationship
between feedback and price premiums, we collected data
for 19 products from 702 completed online auctions from
the auction site of ebay.com (www.ebay.com). Results
showed a significant correlation between feedback and
price premiums for all products. This correlation became
increasingly significant for more expensive products. This
paper contributes to a better understanding of the value of
reputation and trust in EC.
Introduction
Trust is the catalyst in most buyer-seller transactions,
especially when two situational factors are present:
uncertainty (risk), and incomplete product information
(information asymmetry). Therefore, trust is essential for
understanding most economic exchanges (Hirsch, 1978).
Electronic commerce (EC) is a new form of exchange
where online transactions occur among entities that have
never met before. As in traditional exchanges, trust has
been considered crucial in the online transaction process
(Ba et al. 1999), perhaps more given the impersonal
nature of the online environment and the difficulty to
asses product quality prior to purchase (Fung and Lee,
1999). Therefore, many online services are geared toward
providing information on reputation, such as Bizrate and
ebay’s Feedback Forum. However, so far no empirical
evidence shows whether such services are worthwhile.
Although empirical research has established that a good
reputation enables higher prices for a product (Langdon
and Smith, 1998), it is still unclear whether this
relationship is straightforward in the online environment.
Furthermore, most studies have focused on a product’s
past quality as the origin of reputation (Rao and Bergen,
1992; Shapiro, 1983), rather than on sellers' reputation
based on good practices.
This study examines the extent to which buyers use
reputational indicators to form trust perceptions. Using
data from online auctions, we attempt to answer the
following questions: What is the effect of reputation on
price premiums? What is the moderating effect of product
expensiveness on the relationship between reputation and
price premiums? Product expensiveness refers to the
average price for an identical product. We chose online
auctions because buyers are able to manipulate prices.
Trust is analyzed at the interpersonal level of the buyer
towards a seller; therefore, our unit of analysis is the
individual buyer.
Conceptual Development
Following Gambetta (1988), trust is defined as the
subjective probability with which buyers assess that a
seller will perform a particular transaction according to
their confident expectations. Three sources of trust can be
distinguished in the business world (Williamson, 1991):
familiarity or interpersonal contact, values or institutions,
and calculativeness or reputation. Familiarity is not
present in most electronic transactions, while institutional
rules are not well developed (Fung and Lee, 1999).
Therefore, the most prevalent source of trust in this
context is reputation, which arises from an assessment of
the costs and benefits to the seller of cheating in a certain
transaction (Williamson, 1991). A buyer trusts sellers
with good reputation since they are more unlikely to
damage their reputation to exploit a single transaction.
According to Williamson (1985: 74), given a standardized
good, rating services provide incentives to sellers to
behave responsibly.
The relationship between trust and price premiums is
analyzed using sociology and economics. Trust is viewed
as an interpersonal relationship toward an ultimate net
good when information asymmetry exists (Gambetta,
1988). Reputation has an economic value (Hill 1990) and
has been regarded as a major antecedent of trust (Hawes
et al., 1989). Therefore, since trust cannot be readily
observed, reputation is employed as a proxy for trust.
Based on these, trust is viewed as a risk-reduction
mechanism, allowing sellers to receive price premiums
for reducing transaction-specific risk.
Online feedback mechanisms allow buyers to
publicize their transaction experiences with sellers by
posting comments and rating the quality of the service
provided. We consider these mechanisms as social
institutions designed to reduce uncertainty and induce
trust. Appropriate feedback mechanisms can induce trust
based on reputation. Feedback can provide incentives for
cooperative conduct, reduce of opportunism, and signal
good reputation. Buyers use feedback from other parties
to build trust (Scott and Derlega, 1983). In new electronic
marketplaces where parties do not know each other,
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reputation is clearly important in building trust (Fung and
Lee, 1999).  Therefore, we posit that feedback gives a
sufficient indication of buyers' trust.
Reputation makes sense only in an uncertain world;
hence, reputation is a market signaling activity (Shapiro,
1983). In any economic transaction, buyers are principals
and sellers are agents (Williamson, 1985) since there is
some delegation of authority. Since buyers do not have
perfect information, the problem of “information
asymmetry” arises (Akerlof, 1970), which induces
opportunistic behavior. In this context, opportunism refers
to the incomplete disclosure of information, contract
default, and failure to acknowledge warranties
(Williamson, 1985). Facing uncertainty, buyers seek
signals to reduce opportunism (Williamson, 1985). From
an economic perspective, feedback is a signal that induces
trust. While there are other reputational indications
available, feedback is probably the most accessible and
credible; hence, trust is an interpretation of this signal.
In economics, price premiums are the results of high
prices that lead to above-average profits (Klein and
Leffler, 1981). A major reason for price premiums is
sellers’ reputation. Sociology suggests that buyers build
trust presuming that sellers will not jeopardize their
reputation to exploit them. From an economics point of
view, buyers receive feedback as a signal, building trust.
Moreover, feedback mechanisms provide incentives for
cooperative conduct, also promoting buyers' trust.
Therefore, the theoretical argument suggests that buyers
compensate sellers with price premiums to insure safe
transactions. Competition among buyers for trustworthy
sellers results in price premiums since buyers are forced
to pay such premiums. Conversely, buyers demand
compensation for accepting additional risk when they
transact with less reputable sellers.
H1: Sellers with better feedback gain higher
price premiums compared to sellers with worse
feedback.
Expectations of opportunistic behavior reduce trust. A
greater possibility for opportunism derives from a
product's expensiveness since buyers become more
exposed, while sellers have more incentives to cheat.
Given the higher risk inherent in the exchange of
expensive products, risk-averse buyers would seek more
trustworthy sellers. If risk is high, trust becomes a
precondition for sales (Wedow, 1979). Therefore, trust
becomes increasingly important in risky transactions.
 H2: There is a stronger correlation between
feedback and price premiums for more
expensive products.
The diagram below shows the relationship between
trust and price premiums and the moderating effect of
product expensiveness.
Methodology
 A field study was undertaken to examine the
relationship between feedback and price premiums. Data
were collected from the Feedback Forum of the auction
site of ebay.com (www.ebay.com), which allows buyers
to rate transactions with sellers as positive, negative, or
neutral. We collected data from 702 completed auctions
for 19 different products, which were examined to be
identical across auctions. These products belonged to six
popular EC categories as shown in Table 1. Collected data
included the final auction price, and the information from
the Feedback Forum of each seller, showing the number
of positive and negative ratings. Regression analysis was
performed for each product. The independent variable
was the logarithm of the number of positive minus
negative ratings.  The logarithmic transformation was
used to normalize the density distribution of the feedback
variable and reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent
variable was the normalized price premium developed by
subtracting the mean price from the final price of each
product divided by its standard deviation. Furthermore,
regression analysis was performed between product
expensiveness and the regression coefficient (b1) of
feedback and price premium from Table 1. Product
expensiveness was created by the average price of each
product across all completed auctions.
Results
Table 1 presents the regression results between
feedback and price premiums for all products. Moreover,
the results of regression analysis between expensiveness
and the regression coefficient (b1) are shown in Table 2.
H1 predicted that better feedback is correlated with
price premiums. Results showed that there is a significant
relationship between feedback and price premiums for all
products (p<.05). Therefore, feedback plays a significant
role in determining price premiums. H2 predicted that the
correlation between feedback and price premiums
becomes more pronounced for more expensive products.
Regression analysis shows a significant association
(p=.000) between product expensiveness and the
regression coefficient b1 of feedback and price premiums.
TRUST PRICE
PREMIUM
Feedback
Product
Expensivenes
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Table 1. Regression Analysis for H1 Testing
Dependent Variable: Price Premium
Independent Variable: Feedback
Product Mean (STD) N F p R2 b1
OVERALL 232(301) 702 163 .000 .18 .43
DVD 1 252(18) 32 19.3 .001 .39 .62
DVD 2 320(23) 31 18.9 .001 .40 .63
Sony Camera 807(45) 29 58.0 .000 .67 .82
Camcorder 1140(85) 20 110 .000 .86 .93
Dion CD 8.5(1.2) 57 5.5 .022 .09 .30
Santana CD 9.5(1.9) 54 4.4 .042 .08 .28
Windows 181(28) 56 10.5 .002 .16 .40
Photoshop 354(69) 54 26.0 .000 .33 .58
Quicken 42(5) 31 8.0 .009 .22 .40
Win Server 1413(210) 14 15.0 .000 .56 .75
Laser Printer 285(33) 25 7.4 .012 .24 .49
Organizer 263(23) 35 7.3 .011 .18 .43
Inkjet Printer 228(23) 20 9.6 .006 .35 .59
Web Camera 101(9) 18 11.9 .003 .43 .65
Scanner/Fax 236(24) 24 5.1 .034 .18 .43
Modem 56K 17(5) 52 14.0 .000 .21 .46
Memory Chip 423(56) 32 55.7 .000 .42 .65
Gran Turismo 29(3) 67 17.5 .000 .21 .46
Pokemon 40(7) 47 8.7 .005 .16 .40
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigates the extent to which buyers use
feedback to build trust and generate price premiums.
There is a significant relationship between feedback and
price premiums, which becomes more pronounced with
higher transaction-specific risk (product expensiveness).
Moreover, products from certain categories give different
moderating effects. Search goods are goods whose quality
can be fully assessed prior to purchase, while experience
goods are those whose quality is assessed only after
purchase (Nelson, 1970). Since the reputation effect is
likely to be particularly important for experience goods,
(Langdon and Smith, 1996), our future research will
attempt to empirically investigate product type and its
moderating effects on the relationship between feedback
and price premiums.
Table 2. ANOVA for Hypothesis 2 Testing
Dependent Variable: Regression Coefficient  (b1)
Independent Variable: Expensiveness (x1000USD)
N DF Constant Slope F p-value R2
19 17 .431 .348 29.3 .000 .63
In this paper, we assumed that feedback is an
antecedent of trust. However, we should empirically
examine this assumption by measuring trust-based
feedback. This will show that online feedback
mechanisms induce trust and strengthen the results of this
study, proving that trust indeed generates price premiums.
Trust can significantly reduce transaction costs and
facilitate exchanges with mutual gain. Many transaction
costs could be significantly reduced through feedback
mechanisms that discourage opportunistic behavior.
Online feedback mechanisms are similar in nature to the
suitable mechanism of trust presented by Lahno (1995),
which shows that only cooperative conduct pays in the
long run. Therefore, rational sellers will tend to act
trustworthy reducing transaction costs and promoting
mutual gains for both buyers and sellers. The ultimate
objective is to promote a safe online environment with no
information asymmetry where transactions take place
without excessive risk and redundant transaction costs.
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